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Abstract—This paper investigates the capacity region of a
discrete memoryless (DM) multiple access wiretap (MAC-WT)
channel where, besides confidential messages, the users have also
open messages to transmit. All these messages are intended for
the legitimate receiver but only the confidential messages need
to be protected from the eavesdropper. By using random coding,
we find an achievable secrecy rate region, within which perfect
secrecy can be realized, i.e., all users can communicate with the
legitimate receiver with arbitrarily small probability of error,
while the confidential information leaked to the eavesdropper
tends to zero.
I. INTRODUCTION
Different from the key-based cryptographic techniques, in-
formation theoretic secrecy exploits the random propagation
properties of radio channels to prevent eavesdroppers from
extracting confidential information of authorized users, and
has triggered considerable research interest recently [1]. The
study of information theoretic secrecy in communications
starts from several seminal papers [2]–[4]. In [2], Wyner
considered a discrete memoryless (DM) channel with an
eavesdropper which observes a stochastically degraded version
of the output of the main channel, and aimed to maximize the
transmission rate to the legitimate receiver while keeping the
eavesdropper as ignorant of the secret message as possible.
The trade-off between transmission rate and the equivocation
of the eavesdropper was investigated, and the existence of a
secrecy capacity was proven in [2]. Based on [2], in [3] the
achievable rate-equivocation region of a degraded Gaussian
wiretap channel was investigated. In [4], Wyner’s work was
extended to a non-degraded broadcast wiretap channel, and to
a scenario including a confidential message for the legitimate
receiver only and a common message intended for both the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper.
Following the work in [2]–[4], the information theoretic
secrecy problems for several other channel models have been
studied, including the multiple access wiretap (MAC-WT)
channel [5]–[8]. Both [5] and [6] considered a MAC-WT
channel with a weaker eavesdropper which sees a degraded
version of the main channel. Reference [5] developed an outer
bound for the secrecy capacity region of the DM MAC-WT
channel. In [6], two separate secrecy measures were first
defined for a Gaussian MAC-WT channel, and achievable
rate regions were provided for different secrecy constraints
by using Gaussian inputs and stochastic encoders. In [7]
and [8], non-degraded MAC-WT channels were considered.
Specifically, in [7], the authors extended the work of [5] to
a general Gaussian MAC-WT channel, and besides secret
message, each user also had an open message to transmit.
An achievable rate region for both secret and open rates was
then provided. In [8], the MAC-WT channel with a DM main
channel and different wiretapping scenarios were considered.
In this paper, we study the information theoretic secrecy
problem for a general MAC-WT channel. Different from
[7], which assumes Gaussian inputs and Gaussian channels,
we consider DM channels. Each user is assumed to have
a secret message and an open message to transmit. This
constitutes a generalization of the results in [8], where each
user only transmits a secret message. By using random coding,
we find an achievable secrecy rate region, where users can
communicate with legitimate receiver with the arbitrarily small
probability of error, while the confidential information leaked
to the eavesdropper tends to zero.
Furthermore, we also show that the analogous achievable
region given in [7] 1 does not hold in general. In this sense,
our result amends [7, Theorem 1] which appears to be not
correct in general.
II. CHANNEL MODEL
Consider a MAC wiretap communication system with two
users, a legitimate receiver and an eavesdropper as shown in
Fig. 1. Let K = {1, 2} denote the set of users. Each user k ∈ K
needs to send a secret message Mk and an open message Wk
to the legitimate receiver. We assume a DM wiretap channel
(X1,X2, p(y, z|x1, x2),Y,Z) where x1 ∈ X1 and x2 ∈ X2 are
respectively channel inputs from user 1 and user 2, and y ∈ Y
and z ∈ Z are respectively channel outputs at the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper.
1Although this derived for the Gaussian MAC with Gaussian inputs, it
can be easily stated in terms of mutual information expressions and directly
compared with our result.
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Fig. 1. DM MAC-WT channel with an eavesdropper.
Let Rsk and R
o
k denote the rate of user k’s secret and open
messages, respectively. Then, a
(
2nR
s
1 , 2nR
o
1 , 2nR
s
2 , 2nR
o
2 , n
)
secrecy code for the considered MAC-WT channel consists
of
• Four message sets: Mk = [1 : 2nRsk ] and Wk = [1 :
2nR
o
k ],∀k ∈ K. Messages Mk and Wk are uniformly
distributed over Mk and Wk, respectively.
• Two randomized encoders: the encoder of user k maps
message pair (Mk,Wk) ∈Mk×Wk to a codeword Xnk ∈
Xnk .
• A decoder at the legitimate receiver which maps a re-
ceived sequence Y n ∈ Yn to message pairs
(
Mˆk, Wˆk
)
∈
Mk ×Wk,∀k ∈ K.
The secrecy level of the MAC system is evaluated by the
information leakage rate, which is defined as
RE,S =
1
n
I(MS ;Zn), ∀ S ⊆ K, (1)
where MS = {Mk,∀k ∈ S}. For perfect secrecy of all trans-
mitted secret messages, we would like RE,S → 0,∀S ⊆ K.
Note that since messages M1 and M2 are independent, we
have
I(M1,M2;Z
n) = I(M1;Z
n) + I(M2;Z
n|M1)
≥ I(M1;Zn) + I(M2;Zn), (2)
which indicates that if the leakage rate for all confidential
messages vanishes, then the system is secure also for all
possible message subsets.
The average probability of error is defined as
Pe =P
{(
Mˆ1, Wˆ1, Mˆ2, Wˆ2
)
6= (M1,W1,M2,W2)
}
. (3)
A rate tuple (Rs1, R
o
1, R
s
2, R
o
2) is said to be achievable if for any
δ > 0 there exists a sequence of
(
2nR
s
1 , 2nR
o
1 , 2nR
s
2 , 2nR
o
2 , n
)
codes for increasing n such that
lim
n→∞Pe ≤ δ, (4)
lim
n→∞RE,K ≤ δ. (5)
III. MAIN RESULTS
We use the short-hand notation p(x1) and p(x2) to indicate
PX1(x) with x ∈ X1 and PX2(x) with x ∈ X2, respectively.
Analogous short-hand notations are clear from the context. In
this section, we state our main results.
Theorem 1. Let (X1, X2, Y, Z)∼ p(x1)p(x2)p(y, z|x1, x2).
Then, any rate tuple (Rs1, R
o
1, R
s
2, R
o
2) satisfying
∑
k∈S(R
s
k +R
o
k) ≤ I(XS ;Y |XS¯),∀S ⊆ K,∑
k∈S R
s
k ≤ [I(XS ;Y |XS¯)− I(XS ;Z)]+,∀S ⊆ K,
Rs1 +R
s
2 +R
o
k ≤ [I(XK;Y )− I(Xk¯;Z)]+,∀k ∈ K,
(6)
is achievable, where XS = {Xk : k ∈ S}, S¯ is the comple-
ment set of S, i.e., S¯ = K \ S , k¯ = 1 if k = 2, and k¯ = 2 if
k = 1. Let R(X1, X2) denote the set of rate tuples satisfying
(6). Then, the convex hull of the union of R(X1, X2) over
all p(x1)p(x2) is an achievable secrecy rate region of the
considered MAC wiretap channel.
Proof: See Section IV. 
The result in Theorem 1 can be directly extended to the
more general case with K ≥ 1 users.
Lemma 1. Denote K = {1, · · · ,K} and let (XK, Y, Z)
∼∏Kk=1 p(xk)p(y, z|xK). Then, any rate tuple (Rs1, Ro1, · · · ,
RsK , R
o
K) satisfying∑
k∈S
Rsk +
∑
k∈S\S1
Rok ≤ [I(XS ;Y |XS¯)− I(XS1 ;Z)]+ ,
∀S ⊆ K and S1 ⊆ S. (7)
is achievable. Let R(XK) denote the set of rate tuples satisfy-
ing (7). Then, the convex hull of the union of R(XK) over all∏K
k=1 p(xk) is an achievable secrecy rate region of the MAC
wiretap channel with K users.
Proof: This lemma can be proven by a simple extension of
the proof of Theorem 1. 
Remark 1. In reference [7], the same setting of our paper
is considered for the Gaussian MAC wiretap channel. A
superposition encoding rate region, in which the rate 4-tuples
(Rs1, R
o
1, R
s
2, R
o
2) satisfy{∑
k∈S(R
s
k +R
o
k) ≤ I(XS ;Y |XS¯),∀S ⊆ K,∑
k∈S R
s
k ≤ [I(XS ;Y |XS¯)− I(XS ;Z)]+,∀S ⊆ K,
(8)
is given in [7, eq. (19)]. Then, it is stated in [7, Theorem 1]
that the convex hull of the superposition encoding rate region
union over all power constraint is achievable. By comparing
(6) and (8), we notice that they differ in the third inequality of
(6). In Appendix A, we show that the result in [7, Theorem 1]
unfortunately is not correct. In this sense, our result provides a
general achievable rate region for the MAC-WT scenario with
confidential and open messages while [7, Theorem 1] does
not.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let (X1, X2) ∼ p(x1)p(x2), and assume that I(XS ;Y |XS¯)
> I(XS ;Z), ∀ S ⊆ K. In the following, we show that
there exists a
(
2nR
s
1 , 2nR
o
1 , 2nR
s
2 , 2nR
o
2 , n
)
code such that any
rate tuple inside region R(X1, X2), i.e., any (Rs1, R
o
1, R
s
2, R
o
2)
satisfying
∑
k∈S(R
s
k +R
o
k) < I(XS ;Y |XS¯)− , ∀S ⊆ K,∑
k∈S R
s
k<I(XS ;Y |XS¯)−I(XS ;Z)−,∀S ⊆ K,
Rs1 +R
s
2 +R
o
k < I(XK;Y )− I(Xk¯;Z)−, ∀k ∈ K,
(9)
is achievable, where  is an arbitrarily small positive number.
This, together with the standard time-sharing over coding
strategies, suffices to prove the theorem. We start with the
following lemma.
Lemma 2. For any rate tuple (Rs1, Ro1, Rs2, Ro2) satisfying (9),
there exists a rate pair (Rg1, R
g
2) such thatR
g
k ≥ 0, ∀ k ∈ K,∑
k∈S(R
s
k +R
o
k +R
g
k) < I(XS ;Y |XS¯)− , ∀ S ⊆ K,∑
k∈S(R
o
k +R
g
k) ≥ I(XS ;Z), ∀ S ⊆ K,
(10)
Proof: By eliminating Rg1 and R
g
2 in (10) using the Fourier-
Motzkin procedure [9, Appendix D], it can be shown that (9) is
the projection of (10) onto the hyperplane {Rg1 = 0, Rg2 = 0}.
Lemma 2 can thus be proven. Due to space limitation, the
detailed procedure is omitted. 
A. Coding Scheme
For a given rate tuple (Rs1, R
o
1, R
s
2, R
o
2) inside region
R(X1, X2), choose a rate pair (R
g
1, R
g
2) satisfying (10). With-
out loss of generality (w.l.o.g.), assume that 2nR
s
k , 2n(R
o
k+R
g
k)
and 2nR
g
k ,∀k ∈ K are integers. Denote
Lk,mk =
[
(mk − 1)2n(Rok+R
g
k) + 1 : mk2
n(Rok+R
g
k)
]
,
∀k ∈ K,mk ∈Mk,
Lk = {Lk,mk ,mk ∈Mk}
=
[
1 : 2n(R
s
k+R
o
k+R
g
k)
]
, ∀ k ∈ K. (11)
Then, a coding scheme is provided below.
Codebook generation. For each message pair (mk, wk) ∈
Mk × Wk of user k, generate a subcodebook Ck(mk)
by randomly and independently generating 2n(R
o
k+R
g
k) se-
quences xnk (lk) according to
∏n
i=1 p(xki), where lk ∈ Lk,mk .
These subcodebooks constitute the codebook of user k, i.e.,
Ck = {Ck(mk),mk ∈Mk}. The codebooks of all users, i.e.,
Ck,∀k ∈ K, are then revealed to all transmitters and receivers,
including the eavesdropper.
Encoding. Since Rgk ≥ 0,∀k ∈ K, evenly divide each
subcodebook Ck(mk) into 2nRok subsets Ck(mk, wk) of size
2nR
g
k codewords each, for wk ∈ Wk. To send message pair
(mk, wk) ∈ Mk × Wk, encoder k uniformly chooses a
codeword (with index lk) from Ck(mk, wk) and then transmits
xnk (lk).
Decoding. The decoder at the legitimate receiver declares
that (mˆ1, wˆ1, mˆ2, wˆ2) is sent if it is the unique message tuple
such that (xn1 (l1), x
n
2 (l2), y
n) ∈ T (n) (X1, X2, Y ), for some
l1 and l2 such that xnk (lk) ∈ Ck(mˆk, wˆk), for k = 1, 2.
B. Analysis of the probability of error
Since
∑
k∈S(R
s
k+R
o
k+R
g
k) < I(XS ;Y |XS¯)− , ∀S ⊆ K,
it can be proven by using LLN and the packing lemma that
the probability of error averaged over the random codebook
and encoding tends to zero as n → ∞. The proof follows
exactly the same steps used in [9, Subsection 4.5.1]. Hence,
limn→∞ Pe ≤ δ.
C. Analysis of the information leakage rate
For a given codebook Ck, the secret message Mk is a
function of the codeword index Lk. Hence,
I(M1,M2;Z
n)
=H(M1) +H(M2)−H(M1,M2|Zn)
=nRs1 + nR
s
2 −H(L1, L2|Zn) +H(L1, L2|M1,M2, Zn).
(12)
In order to measure the information leakage rate (12), we first
transform H(L1, L2|Zn) as follows
H(L1, L2|Zn)
=H(L1, L2)− I(L1, L2;Zn)
(a)
=H(L1) +H(L2)− I(L1, L2, Xn1 , Xn2 ;Zn)
(b)
=n(Rs1 +R
o
1 +R
g
1 +R
s
2 +R
o
2 +R
g
2)− I(Xn1 , Xn2 ;Zn)
(c)
=n(Rs1 +R
o
1 +R
g
1 +R
s
2 +R
o
2 +R
g
2)− nI(X1, X2;Z),
(13)
where (a) holds since Xn1 and X
n
2 are respectively func-
tions of indexes L1 and L2, (b) holds since (L1, L2) →
(Xn1 , X
n
2 ) → Zn forms a Markov chain, and (c) follows
since p(xn1 , x
n
2 , z
n) =
∏n
i=1 pX1,X2,Z(x1i, x2i, zi). Then, we
provide an upper bound on term H(L1, L2|M1,M2, Zn) in
the following theorem.
Theorem 2.
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(L1, L2|M1,M2, Zn)
≤ Ro1 +Rg1 +Ro2 +Rg2 − I(X1, X2;Z) + δ. (14)
Proof: See Appendix B. 
Substituting (13) and (14) into (12), we have
lim
n→∞RE,K = limn→∞
1
n
I(M1,M2;Z
n) ≤ δ. (15)
Theorem 1 is thus proven.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied the capacity region of a discrete
memoryless (DM) multiple access wiretap (MAC-WT) chan-
nel where, besides confidential messages, the users have also
open messages to transmit. Different from [7], which assumed
Gaussian inputs and Gaussian channels, we considered general
inputs and DM channels. By using random coding, we found
an achievable rate region where the information leakage of the
confidential messages to the eavesdropper and the probability
of error of all messages at the intended receiver vanish as
the block length increase to infinity. Furthermore, we also
correct the result in [7] that studied the same scenario in the
Gaussian MAC case, but where the provided achievable region
is actually not generally achievable.
APPENDIX A
For brevity, we also consider the two-user case for reference
[7]. When proving [7, Theorem 1], it is stated in [7] that for
any rate tuple (Rs1, R
o
1, R
s
2, R
o
2) satisfying (8), there exists R
x
k
such that [7, eq. (26) – (28)] hold. When Rok is large, to ensure
that [7, eq. (27)] is satisfied, some open message of user k can
be reclassified as secret message (we call this rate splitting in
the following). For the sake of convenience, we rewrite [7, eq.
(26) – (28)] as follows∑
k∈S
(Rsk +R
o
k +R
x
k) ≤ I(XS ;Y |XS¯), ∀ S ⊆ K, (16)∑
k∈S
(Rok +R
x
k) ≤ I(XS ;Z|XS¯),∀S ⊆ K,
with equality if S = K, (17)∑
k∈S
Rsk ≤ [I(XS ;Y |XS¯)− I(XS ;Z)]+ , ∀ S ⊆ K. (18)
Note that for comparison, we replace log expressions for
the Gaussian case with Gaussian inputs in [7] with mutual
informations. Moreover, although not mentioned, it is clear
by the definition of Rxk that
Rxk ≥ 0, ∀ k ∈ K. (19)
In order to check whether it is true that for any rate tuple
(Rs1, R
o
1, R
s
2, R
o
2) satisfying (8), with rate splitting, there exists
Rxk such that (16) – (19) hold, we eliminate R
x
k in (16) – (19)
using the Fourier-Motzkin procedure [9, Appendix D], and get
∑
k∈S(R
s
k +R
o
k) ≤ I(XS ;Y |XS¯),∀S ⊆ K,∑
k∈S R
s
k ≤ [I(XS ;Y |XS¯)− I(XS ;Z)]+,∀S ⊆ K,∑
k∈S R
o
k ≤ I(XS ;Z|XS¯),∀S ⊆ K.
(20)
Denote the sets of rate tuples (Rs1, R
o
1, R
s
2, R
o
2) satisfying (6),
(8) and (20) by R, R1 and R2, respectively. Then, if [7,
Theorem 1] is true, with rate splitting, all rate tuples in region
R1 should be able to be transformed to rate tuples in region
R2. However, in the following we show that R2 is equivalent
to R, and there exist rate tuples in region R1 which can not
be transformed to rate tuples in region R2.
For any given rate tuple A = (Rs1, R
o
1, R
s
2, R
o
2) in region
R2, it is obvious from (20) that{
Rs1 +R
o
1 +R
s
2 ≤ [I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X2;Z)]+ ,
Rs1 +R
s
2 +R
o
2 ≤ [I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1;Z)]+ .
(21)
Hence, A is also in region R.
Based on the values of Ro1 and R
o
2, all rate tuples in region
R can be divided into 6 categories as shown in Fig. 2. In
the following we show that, with rate splitting, any given rate
tuple B = (Rs1, R
o
1, R
s
2, R
o
2) in region R can be transformed
to another rate tuple B′ in region R2.
If rate tuple B belongs to category 1, i.e.,∑
k∈S
Rok ≤ I(XS ;Z|XS¯),∀S ⊆ K, (22)
it is obvious that B is also in region R2.
o
1
R
o
2
R
1 2
( ; | )I X Z X
2 1
( ; | )I X Z X
o o
1 2
1 2
( , ; )
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Fig. 2. Classification of rate tuples.
If rate tuple B belongs to category 2, i.e.,{
Ro1 > I(X1;Y |X2),
0 ≤ Ro2 ≤ I(X2;Z), (23)
let
R˜o1 = I(X1;Z|X2),
R˜s1 = R
s
1 +R
o
1 − I(X1;Z|X2). (24)
We get a new rate tuple B′ = (R˜s1, R˜
o
1, R
s
2, R
o
2). Since B is
in region R, it satisfies (6). Hence,
R˜o1 +R
o
2 = I(X1;Z|X2) +Ro2
≤ I(X1, X2;Z),
R˜s1 + R˜
o
1 = R
s
1 +R
o
1
≤ I(X1;Y |X2),
R˜s1 + R˜
o
1 +R
s
2 +R
o
2 = R
s
1 +R
o
1 +R
s
2 +R
o
2
≤ I(X1, X2;Y ),
R˜s1 = R
s
1 +R
o
1 − I(X1;Y |X2)
≤ I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Z|X2)
≤ [I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Z)]+ ,
R˜s1 +R
s
2 = R
s
1 +R
o
1 +R
s
2 − I(X1;Y |X2)
≤ [I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X2;Z)]+ − I(X1;Z|X2)
≤ [I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1, X2;Z)]+ . (25)
The values of Rs2 +R
o
2 and R
s
2 remain unchanged. Hence, B
′
is in region R2.
If B belongs to category 3, i.e.,{
I(X2;Z) < R
o
2 ≤ I(X2;Z|X1),
Ro1 +R
o
2 > I(X1, X2;Z),
(26)
let
R˜o1 = I(X1, X2;Z)−Ro2,
R˜s1 = R
s
1 +R
o
1 +R
o
2 − I(X1, X2;Z). (27)
A new rate tuple B′ = (R˜s1, R˜
o
1, R
s
2, R
o
2) is then obtained.
Since
R˜o1 +R
o
2 = I(X1, X2;Z),
R˜s1 + R˜
o
1 = R
s
1 +R
o
1
≤ I(X1;Y |X2),
R˜s1 + R˜
o
1 +R
s
2 +R
o
2 = R
s
1 +R
o
1 +R
s
2 +R
o
2
≤ I(X1, X2;Y ),
R˜s1 = R
s
1 +R
o
1 +R
o
2 − I(X1, X2;Z)
≤ I(X1;Y |X2) +Ro2 − I(X1;Z)− I(X2;Z|X1)
≤ [I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Z)]+ ,
R˜s1 +R
s
2 = R
s
1 +R
o
1 +R
s
2 +R
o
2 − I(X1, X2;Z)
≤ [I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1, X2;Z)]+ , (28)
and the values of Rs2 + R
o
2 and R
s
2 remain unchanged, B
′ is
in region R2.
Analogously, if B belongs to category 4, i.e.,{
0 ≤ Ro1 ≤ I(X1;Z),
Ro2 > I(X2;Z|X1), (29)
let
R˜o2 = I(X2;Z|X1),
R˜s2 = R
s
2 +R
o
2 − I(X2;Z|X1), (30)
and if B belongs to category 5, i.e.,{
I(X1;Z) < R
o
1 ≤ I(X1;Z|X2),
Ro2 > I(X2;Z|X1), (31)
let
R˜o2 = I(X1, X2;Z)−Ro1,
R˜s2 = R
o
1 +R
s
2 +R
o
2 − I(X1, X2;Z). (32)
It can be similarly proven that the newly obtained rate tuple
B′ = (Rs1, R
o
1, R˜
s
2, R˜
o
2) is in region R2.
If B belongs to category 6, i.e.,{
Ro1 > I(X1;Z|X2),
Ro2 > I(X2;Z|X1), (33)
let
R˜o1 = I(X1;Z|X2),
R˜s1 = R
s
1 +R
o
1 − I(X1;Z|X2),
R˜o2 = I(X2;Z),
R˜s2 = R
s
2 +R
o
2 − I(X2;Z). (34)
Then,
R˜o1 + R˜
o
2 = I(X1, X2;Z),∑
k∈S
(R˜sk + R˜
o
k) =
∑
k∈S
(Rsk +R
o
k)
≤ I(XS ;Y |XS¯),∀S ⊆ K,
R˜s1 ≤ I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Z|X2)
≤ [I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Z)]+ ,
R˜s2 ≤ [I(X2;Y |X1)− I(X2;Z)]+ ,
R˜s1 + R˜
s
2 = R
s
1 +R
o
1 +R
s
2 +R
o
2 − I(X1, X2;Z)
≤ [I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1, X2;Z)]+ . (35)
Rate tuple B′ = (R˜s1, R˜
o
1, R˜
s
2, R˜
o
2) is thus in region R2.
Until now, we have shown that any rate tuple A in region
R2 is also in region R, and by using rate splitting, any rate
tuple B in region R can be transformed to another rate tuple
B′ in regionR2. Therefore, with rate splittingR2 is equivalent
to R.
Next, we show that there exist rate tuples in region R1
which can not be transformed to rate tuples in region R2.
Consider rate tuple C = (Rs1, R
o
1, R
s
2, R
o
2), where
Rs1 = [I(X1;Y |X2)− I(X1;Z)]+ ,
Ro1 = 0,
Rs2 = [I(X2;Y )− I(X2;Z|X1)]+ ,
Ro2 = I(X1, X2;Z). (36)
Since (X1, X2, Y, Z)∼ p(x1)p(x2)p(y, z|x1, x2), it is possi-
ble that
I(X2;Y ) + I(X1;Z) ≤ I(X2;Y |X1),
I(X1, X2;Z) > I(X2;Z|X1). (37)
When the above inequality holds, it can be easily found
that rate tuple C satisfies (8) and is thus in region R1.
However, since Ro2 > I(X2;Z|X1), (20) is not satisfied,
and C is thus outside region R2. Because Rs1 + R
s
2 =
[I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1, X2;Z)]+, it would be impossible to
reduce Ro2 by increasing R
s
2, i.e., reclassifying some open
message of user 2 as secret message of user 2, since otherwise
Rs1+R
s
2 > [I(X1, X2;Y )− I(X1, X2;Z)]+. In this case, rate
tuple C can not be transformed to another rate tuple in region
R1, indicating that not all rate tuples in region R1 can be
transformed to rate tuples in regionR2 even with rate splitting.
Based on the above analysis, it can be concluded that the
statement of [7, Theorem 1] doe snot hold in general.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
For given n-th order product distribution on Xn1 ×Xn2 ×Zn,
recall the definition of conditional -typical sets
T (n) (X1, X2|zn)
=
{
(xn1 , x
n
2 )|(xn1 , xn2 , zn) ∈ T (n) (X1, X2, Z)
}
, (38)
T (n) (X2|xn1 , zn)=
{
xn2 |(xn1 , xn2 , zn)∈T (n) (X1, X2, Z)
}
,(39)
T (n) (X1|xn2 , zn)=
{
xn1 |(xn1 , xn2 , zn)∈T (n) (X1, X2, Z)
}
.(40)
To prove Theorem 2, we bound H(L1, L2|m1,m2, Zn) for
every secret message pair (m1,m2). First, for a given received
signal zn at the eavesdropper, assume that it is a typical
sequence, i.e., zn ∈ T (n) (Z), and define
D(m1,m2, zn)=
{
(l1, l2)|(xn1 (l1), xn2 (l2))∈T (n) (X1, X2|zn),
∀ (l1, l2) ∈ L1,m1 × L2,m2} , (41)
and
N(m1,m2, z
n) = |D(m1,m2, zn)| . (42)
In the following theorem, we give an upper bound on the
expectation and the variance of N(m1,m2, zn).
Theorem 3. The expectation and variance of N(m1,m2, zn)
can be bounded as
E {N(m1,m2, zn)} ≤ 2n(∆+δ1()), (43)
Var {N(m1,m2, zn)} ≤ 2n(∆+δ1()) +
∑
k∈K
2n(2∆−∆k+δ1()),
(44)
where δ1() is given in (59), and
∆ = Ro1 +R
g
1 +R
o
2 +R
g
2 − I(X1, X2;Z),
∆k = R
o
k +R
g
k − I(Xk;Z), ∀ k ∈ K. (45)
Proof: See Appendix C. 
Next, define the event
E(m1,m2, zn) =
{
N(m1,m2, z
n) ≥ 2n(∆+δ1())+1
}
. (46)
We have
P {E(m1,m2, zn)}
=P
{
N(m1,m2, z
n) ≥ 2n(∆+δ1())+1
}
≤P
{
N(m1,m2, z
n) ≥ E {N(m1,m2, zn)}+ 2n(∆+δ1())
}
≤P
{
|N(m1,m2, zn)−E {N(m1,m2, zn)}|≥2n(∆+δ1())
}
(a)
≤ Var {N(m1,m2, z
n)}
22n(∆+δ1())
(b)
≤2−n(∆+δ1()) +
∑
k∈K
2−n(∆k+δ1()), (47)
where step (a) follows by applying the Chebyshev inequality,
and (b) follows by (44). Due to (10), ∆ ≥ 0 and ∆k ≥
0,∀k ∈ K. Then, it is obvious that P {E(m1,m2, zn)} → 0
as n→∞. For any zn ∈ T (n) (Z), define indicator variable
E(m1,m2, z
n)=
{
1, if E(m1,m2, zn) occurs,
0, otherwise. (48)
Then, P {E(m1,m2, zn) = 1} → 0 as n→∞.
Since there are 2n(R
o
k+R
g
k) codewords in each subcodebook
Ck(mk),∀k ∈ K, we have
H(L1, L2|m1,m2, zn)
≤ log(2n(Ro1+Rg1+Ro2+Rg2))
=n(Ro1 +R
g
1 +R
o
2 +R
g
2), ∀ zn ∈ Zn, (49)
and
H(L1, L2|m1,m2, Zn)
=
∑
zn∈Zn
p(zn)H(L1, L2|m1,m2, zn)
≤n(Ro1 +Rg1 +Ro2 +Rg2). (50)
Moreover, based on the definition of N(m1,m2, zn) in (42),
we have
H(L1, L2|m1,m2, E(m1,m2, zn) = 0, zn)
≤ log(N(m1,m2, zn))
≤n(∆ + δ1()) + 1, ∀ zn ∈ T (n) (Z), (51)
where the last step holds due to the fact that when
E(m1,m2, z
n) = 0, N(m1,m2, zn) ≤ 2n(∆+δ1())+1. Based
on (49), (50) and (51), H(L1, L2|m1,m2, Zn) can be upper-
bounded as follows
H(L1, L2|m1,m2, Zn)
=P
{
Zn∈T (n) (Z)
}
H(L1, L2|m1,m2, Zn, Zn∈T (n) (Z))
+P
{
Zn /∈T (n) (Z)
}
H(L1, L2|m1,m2, Zn, Zn /∈T (n) (Z))
≤
∑
zn∈T (n) (Z)
p(zn)H(L1, L2|m1,m2, zn) + nα1
=
∑
zn∈T (n) (Z)
{p1(zn)H(L1, L2|m1,m2, E(m1,m2, zn)=1, zn)
+ p2(z
n)H(L1, L2|m1,m2, E(m1,m2, zn)=0, zn)}+ nα1
≤
∑
zn∈T (n) (Z)
{
p(zn)α2H(L1, L2|m1,m2, zn)
+p(zn)H(L1, L2|m1,m2, E(m1,m2, zn) = 0, zn)
}
+ nα1
≤n(∆ + δ2()), (52)
where
α1 = P
{
Zn /∈ T (n) (Z)
}
(Ro1 +R
g
1 +R
o
2 +R
g
2),
p1(z
n) = p(zn)P {E(m1,m2, zn) = 1} , ∀ zn ∈ T (n) (Z)
p2(z
n) = p(zn)P {E(m1,m2, zn) = 0} , ∀ zn ∈ T (n) (Z)
α2 = max
{
P {E(m1,m2, zn) = 1} , ∀ zn ∈ T (n) (Z)
}
,
δ2() = δ1() + α2(R
o
1 +R
g
1 +R
o
2 +R
g
2) +
1
n
+ α1. (53)
E
{
[N(m1,m2, z
n)]2
}
=
∑
(l1,l2)∈L1,m1×L2,m2
{
P
{
(xn1 (l1), x
n
2 (l2)) ∈ T (n) (X1, X2|zn)
}
+
∑
l′2∈L2,m2\{l2}
P
{
(xn1 (l1), x
n
2 (l2)) ∈ T (n) (X1, X2|zn), xn2 (l′2) ∈ T (n) (X2|xn1 (l1), zn)
}
+
∑
l′1∈L1,m1\{l1}
P
{
(xn1 (l1), x
n
2 (l2)) ∈ T (n) (X1, X2|zn), xn1 (l′1) ∈ T (n) (X1|xn2 (l2), zn)
}
+
∑
(l′1,l
′
2)∈L1,m1×L2,m2\{(l1,l2)}
P
{
(xn1 (l1), x
n
2 (l2)), (x
n
1 (l
′
1), x
n
2 (l
′
2)) ∈ T (n) (X1, X2|zn)
}}
= 2n(R
o
1+R
g
1+R
o
2+R
g
2)
{
p1 + (2
n(Ro2+R
g
2) − 1)p2 + (2n(Ro1+R
g
1) − 1)p3 + (2n(Ro1+R
g
1+R
o
2+R
g
2) − 1)p4
}
≤ 2n(∆+δ1()) +
∑
k∈K
2n(2∆−∆k+δ1()) + {E[N(m1,m2, zn)]}2 . (66)
By the LLN, P
{
Zn /∈ T (n) (Z)
}
→ 0 as n → ∞.
Hence, α1 → 0 as n → ∞. In addition, since
P {E(m1,m2, zn) = 1} → 0,∀zn ∈ T (n) (Z) as n → ∞,
α2 → 0 as n → ∞. δ2() can thus be arbitrarily small as
n→∞. Hence,
lim
n→∞
1
n
H(L1, L2|M1,M2, Zn)
= lim
n→∞
2nR
s
1∑
m1=1
2nR
s
2∑
m2=1
1
n
2−n(R
s
1+R
s
2)H(L1, L2|m1,m2, Zn)
≤ ∆ + δ. (54)
Theorem 2 is thus proven.
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PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Using the conditional typicality lemma, for sufficiently large
n, we have
|T (n) (X1, X2|zn)| ≤ 2n(H(X1,X2|Z)+), (55)
|T (n) (X2|xn1 , zn)| ≤ 2n(H(X2|X1,Z)+), (56)
|T (n) (X1|xn2 , zn)| ≤ 2n(H(X1|X2,Z)+). (57)
Let
p1 = P
{
(Xn1 , X
n
2 ) ∈ T (n) (X1, X2|zn)
}
. (58)
Since Xn1 and X
n
2 are independent, an upper bound of p1 can
be obtained as follows
p1 =
∑
(xn1 ,x
n
2 )∈T (n) (X1,X2|zn)
p(xn1 )p(x
n
2 )
≤ 2n(H(X1,X2|Z)+)2−n(H(X1)−)2−n(H(X2)−)
≤ 2−n(I(X1,X2;Z)−δ1()), (59)
where δ1() = 5. Furthermore, denote
p2 =P
{
(Xn1 , X
n
2 )∈T (n) (X1, X2|zn), X˜n2 ∈T (n) (X2|xn1 , zn)
}
,
p3 =P
{
(Xn1 , X
n
2 )∈T (n) (X1, X2|zn), X˜n1 ∈T (n) (X1|xn2 , zn)
}
,
p4 =P
{
(Xn1 , X
n
2 ), (X˜
n
1 , X˜
n
2 )∈T (n) (X1, X2|zn)
}
=p21,
(60)
where T (n) (X2|xn1 , zn) and T (n) (X1|xn2 , zn) are defined in
(39) and (40), respectively. Since Xn1 , X
n
2 and X˜
n
2 are
independent, we have
p2 =
∑
(xn1 ,x
n
2 )∈T (n) (X1,X2|zn)
p(xn1 )p(x
n
2 )
∑
x˜n2∈T (n) (X2|xn1 ,zn)
p(x˜n2 )
≤ 2−n(I(X1,X2;Z)−3)2n(H(X2|X1,Z)+)2−n(H(X2)−)
= 2−n(I(X1,X2;Z)+I(X2;Z|X1)−δ1()). (61)
Similarly, p3 can be upper bounded as follows
p3 ≤ 2−n(I(X1,X2;Z)+I(X1;Z|X2)−δ1()). (62)
By introducing indicator variable
E′(l1, l2)=
{
1, if (xn1 (l1), x
n
2 (l2))∈T (n) (X1, X2|zn),
0, otherwise,
(63)
where zn ∈ T (n) (Z) and (l1, l2) ∈ L1,m1 × L2,m2 ,
N (m1,m2, z
n) can be re-presented as
N(m1,m2, z
n) =
∑
(l1,l2)∈L1,m1×L2,m2
E′(l1, l2). (64)
Then, we have (65) as follows and (66) at the top of this page
E {N(m1,m2, zn)} =
∑
(l1,l2)∈L1,m1×L2,m2
E {E′(l1, l2)}
=
∑
(l1,l2)∈L1,m1×L2,m2
p1
=|L1,m1 × L2,m2 |p1
=2n(R
o
1+R
g
1+R
o
2+R
g
2)p1
≤2n(∆+δ1()). (65)
According to (65) and (66)
Var {N(m1,m2, zn)}
=E
{
[N(m1,m2, z
n)]2
}− {E[N(m1,m2, zn)]}2
≤2n(∆+δ1()) +
∑
k∈K
2n(2∆−∆k+δ1()). (67)
Theorem 3 is thus proven.
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